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1 Introduction
Firms that are active in oligopolistic markets often face a considerable amount
of uncertainty about demand, competitors’ costs, and other market features
that are important for the firms’ decisions. Reflecting this fact, a large theoret-
ical literature has developed that studies firm behavior under such uncertainty.
In particular, a significant number of papers have investigated firms’ incentives
to engage in information sharing, information acquisition, and strategic experi-
mentation.1
Although this is a rich literature with many important and useful insights,
most of its contributions share an unappealing feature: they make assumptions
that imply that either (for those models where firms choose quantities) market
price can be negative or (for those models where firms choose prices) firms’
output can be negative. The typical justification for making these assump-
tions is analytical tractability. It is also often argued that, by making appro-
priate additional assumptions about the distribution of the stochastic variable
(e.g., by letting its variance be suﬃciently low), one can ensure that a negative
price/quantity will occur only with a low probability.2 One problem with this
argument, however, is that the real-world situations that the models are sup-
posed to capture often involve a substantial amount of uncertainty. One may
therefore wonder whether the practice of using models where prices/quantities
can be negative makes us overlook valuable insights.3
The first ones to investigate this question were Malueg and Tsutsui (1998a).4
1For example, papers on information sharing include Clarke (1983), Gal-Or (1985, 1986), Li
(1985), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Ponssard (1979), Raith (1996), Sakai and Yamato
(1989), Shapiro (1986), and Vives (1984, 1990).
2 See, for example, Vives (1984, p. 77, n. 2; 1999, Ch. 8, n. 6).
3A common modeling framework is to assume a linear cost function and a linear inverse
demand function, P (X) = a− bX, where a is stochastic. Each firm observes a private signal
si, and the joint distribution of a and si has the proporty that the conditional expectation
function, E (a | si), is linear. An example of such a distribution, which is often explicitly
assumed, is a bivariate normal. If the demand intercept a indeed is normally distributed,
then obviously market price will be negative for some realizations, since then a itself can be
negative. But also if the distribution is such that a always takes non-negative values, market
price will be negative if industry output (which is an endogenous variable) is large enough.
See also the discussion in Malueg and Tsutsui (1998a, p. 364).
4The same authors have also investigated questions that are closely related to this one.
Indeed, imposing a binding non-negativity constraint is only one way of deviating from the
standard framework with linear conditional expectation functions that was discussed in foot-
note 3; Malueg and Tsutsui (1996, 1998b) study two of these. Malueg and Tsutsui (1996)
assume uncertainty about the slope (rather than the intercept) of the demand function, and
they show that this gives rise to result (i) mentioned below. Malueg and Tsutsui (1998b)
show the same result in a model with uncertainty about the intercept but with alternative
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They study a Cournot duopoly model of information sharing and explicitly im-
pose the constraint that market price must be non-negative for all demand re-
alizations. Following the standard literature, Malueg and Tsutsui assume that
the inverse demand function is linear and that the uncertainty concerns the
stochastic intercept of this function. At an ex ante stage, each duopolist can
commit to adding the private signal they will observe to a common pool. After
having observed their private signals and possibly shared this information, the
firms compete in quantities. In order to make the model suﬃciently tractable
and still be able to account for the non-negativity constraint, Malueg and Tsut-
sui assume that the stochastic intercept can take on only two distinct values.
In spite of this, the algebra becomes quite involved. Nevertheless, by means of
numerical examples, Malueg and Tsutsui show two results that were not previ-
ously known: when the non-negativity constraint is accounted for, information
sharing can (i) be profitable for the firms and (ii) reduce social welfare (defined
as the expected total surplus).
Neither (i) nor (ii) can occur in the standard model described in footnote
3, which assumed that cost, demand and conditional expectation functions are
linear, and that there is no non-negativity constraint.5 In particular, in that
model, if the firms share their information, this has an unambiguously positive
eﬀect on expected total surplus: output increases if the additional information
the firms get access to suggests that demand is relatively high, and otherwise it
drops. Expected output is unaﬀected, however; moreover, the welfare gains in a
good state more than compensates for the losses in a bad state. In Malueg and
Tsutsui’s example, in contrast, the fact that there is a non-negativity constraint
on price that is sometimes binding makes expected output fall as a result of
information sharing, which reduces social welfare.
The logic of the welfare result in Malueg and Tsutsui (1998a) suggests that
it may not driven by the sharing of private information per se, but rather by
distributional assumptions regarding this stochastic variable.
5 It is important to note, however, that imposing a non-negativity constraint is not necessary
to obtain result (i) – this follows from Malueg and Tsutsui (1996, 1998b), who show the result
without a binding non-negativity constraint but with other deviations from the standard
model. Similarly, we should not expect a binding non-negativity constraint to be a necessary
requirement for result (ii). Although I cannot oﬀer a proof of this, it seems plausible that
the result is driven by the convexity of the (expected) demand function (I am grateful to
an anonymous referee and to Patrick Legros for suggesting this to me). The non-negativity
constraint is just one way of obtaining the convexity.
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the fact that the firms, more generally, get access to more information. If this is
correct, we may be able to learn more about the welfare eﬀects of information
sharing in an environment where there is a non-negativity constraint on price
by studying a version of Malueg and Tsutsui’s model in which information is
symmetric (but still incomplete). In this paper I carry out such an study. I
analyze the eﬀects of providing all firms in an n-firm Cournot oligopoly with
the same additional information. My model is thus, in one dimension, simpler
than (or at least diﬀerent from) Malueg and Tsutsui’s in that it does not allow
for any asymmetric information. In another dimension, however, it is richer
than theirs as it allows for an arbitrary number of firms and one can relatively
easily solve for its equilibria (for the whole parameter space, not only for some
particular numerical examples). This modeling approach makes it possible to
derive further insights into what the circumstances under which better informed
firms can be bad for welfare look like, in particular in terms of the cost parameter
and the number of firms in the industry. My model also, I believe, facilitates
an understanding of the intuition of the results.6
The analysis shows that, like in Malueg and Tsutsui (1998a), taking the
non-negativity constraint on market price into account can indeed reverse the
welfare result found in the standard literature. The reason why informed firms
can be detrimental to expected total surplus is that if a firm chooses a relatively
large quantity and demand turns out to be low, its losses will, because of the
non-negativity constraint on price, be limited to its production costs. Rela-
tive to a model in which price can be negative, this makes the firm bolder (or
more aggressive) when choosing its output: it chooses a larger quantity than it
would have done without the non-negativity constraint, which is good for the
consumers and for total surplus. This “boldness eﬀect” is particularly strong
6The important and special feature of Malueg and Tsutsui’s model that market price must
be non-negative for all demand realization is retained in my model. That is, if the firms have
been optimistic about demand to such an extent that a negative price is required for the
market to clear, then market price simply equals zero. The fact that market price on these
occasions is zero should not be interpreted too literally, however. A richer model, which I
conjecture would give rise to qualitatively the same results as here, could assume that there
are (constant unit) costs associated with selling the good. If market price falls below this cost
level, the firms will prefer not to sell. In such a model, the non-negativity constraint assumed
in the present paper would refer to the market price net of selling costs, and it could thus be
binding also for a strictly positive (gross) market price.
Another way of thinking about the non-negativity constraint would be that it refers to the
market price net of marginal cost, and that there is a regulatory rule that makes a negative
such net price illegal (justified by concerns for limit pricing).
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for low values of the marginal cost parameter, since then the overall production
costs are low.7
The analysis also shows – again in contrast to the literature that ignores
the non-negativity constraint – that taking the non-negativity constraint on
market price into account can give rise to a multiplicity of equilibria (a result
that does not appear in any of Malueg and Tsutsui’s papers). The reason why
this model gives rise to a multiplicity of equilibria is that the uncertainty about
(inverse) demand together with the assumption that market price cannot be
negative make the expected (inverse) demand function convex. It is well known
that a Cournot model with known demand may have multiple equilibria if the
demand function is suﬃciently convex. Intuitively, for a demand function that is
convex enough, the choice variables (i.e., the output levels) of a typical firm and
one of its competitors are strategic complements: the marginal profit of a typical
firm increases with the output of its competitor. As a result, multiple equilibria
can be sustained through self-fulfilling beliefs on the part of the firms. In the
model studied in the present paper, where demand is known to be linear (for
positive price levels) but has an unknown intercept, a convexity of the expected
demand schedule arises naturally because of the non-negativity constraint on
price, and this creates a multiplicity of equilibria for the same reason as in a
model with known and suﬃciently convex demand.8
Although the arguments of the paper are developed in a Cournot setting and
with uncertainty about the demand intercept, the points I make are relevant
also under other assumptions. Later in the paper I will discuss the eﬀects of
imposing a non-negativity constraint on quantities in the Bertrand model (see
the end of Section 3.2) and the consequences of assuming uncertainty about
7This is consistent with the analysis in Malueg and Tsutsui (1998a). They show their
welfare result in an example in which the (constant) marginal cost equals zero. In the appendix
of their paper, they also show the result in an example with a strictly positive (but low)
marginal cost.
8 In a complete information Cournot model more generally (also in symmetric versions of
this model), there can exist multiple equilibria of another kind, namely equilibria in which
one firm or a subset of firms produce a positive quantity whereas the others are inactive,
producing nothing; see Amir and Lambson (2000). Such equilibria will not exist, however, in
the model that I investigate.
The standard formulation of the linear-quadratic Cournot model with incomplete informa-
tion – which allows for negative prices and quantities – does have a unique equilibrium. This
is typically proven by rewriting (using a technique suggested by Basar and Ho, 1974) a firm’s
payoﬀ function in a way that does not alter the first-order condition but which transforms the
problem into a team decision problem. Then a uniqueness theorem due to Radner (1962) can
be used. See, for example, Vives (1999).
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other parameters than the demand intercept (see the concluding section).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the
model is described. Section 3 presents the analysis and the results: Section 3.1
demonstrates and discusses the multiplicity result and Section 3.2 does the same
with the welfare result. Section 4 concludes. Most of the algebra is relegated to
an appendix.
2 Model
Consider a Cournot model with n ≥ 1 firms producing a homogeneous good.
The firms are identical and indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each one of them
faces a linear inverse demand function p (X) = max {0, α−X}, where p is price,
X ≡
Pn
i=1 xi is industry output, xi is firm i’s output, and α > 0 is an exogenous
parameter. All firms have the same constant marginal cost technology, with
marginal cost denoted c > 0, and there is no fixed cost.
The intercept of the demand function, α, is unknown by the firms. The
intercept is either “low,” in which case α = a − ∆, or “high,” in which case
α = a+∆, with a > ∆ > 0 and a > c. Each one of the states of nature occurs
with equal probability: Pr (α = a−∆) = Pr (α = a+∆) = 1/2.
Each firm i is risk neutral and maximizes its expected profits. Its choice
variable is its own output, xi ≥ 0, which it chooses simultaneously with the
other firms. I will confine attention to pure strategy Nash equilibria of this
game.
3 Analysis and Results
The algebra of the model is worked out in the Appendix. Here I will just state
the results and subsequently explain the logic behind them. First, however, we
need some more terminology and notation.
Let us make the observation that the fact that the intercept of the inverse
demand function is stochastic together with the non-negativity constraint on
market price imply that the expected price schedule, E {p (X)}, has a kink. (To
see this, the reader may want to draw a figure.) The kink is located at that
level of industry output where the price schedule in a low-demand state meets
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the horizontal axis,9 a−∆ ≡ Xkink. I will say that if X < Xkink, then industry
output is located left of the kink; and if Xkink < X, then industry output is
located right of the kink.
Let the cut-oﬀ values ∆∗ and ∆∗∗ be defined by
∆∗ ≡
¡
2−
√
2
¢
a+
¡
n+ 2
√
2− 3
¢
c
n+
√
2− 1
, (1)
∆∗∗ ≡
2
¡√
2− 1
¢
a+
¡
n+ 3− 2
√
2
¢
c
n+ 1
. (2)
One can readily verify that 0 < ∆∗ < ∆∗∗ < a for n ≥ 2, and 0 < ∆∗ = ∆∗∗ < a
for n = 1. Moreover, let the output levels x∗L and x
∗
R be defined by
x∗L ≡
a− c
n+ 1
, x∗R ≡
a+∆− 2c
n+ 1
. (3)
Proposition 1.
– For ∆ ∈ (0,∆∗) there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, each firm produces x∗L, and industry output is located
left of the kink.
– For ∆ ∈ (∆∗∗, a) there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium. In
this equilibrium, each firm’s output equals x∗R, and industry output
is located right of the kink.
– For ∆ ∈ [∆∗,∆∗∗] there are exactly two pure strategy equilibria.
One is left of the kink with each firm’s output equal to x∗L, whereas
the other is right of the kink with each firm’s output equal to x∗R.
3.1 Multiplicity of Equilibria
Figure 1 depicts ∆∗ and ∆∗∗ as (linear) functions of c for the case where n ≥ 2
(recall that ∆∗ and ∆∗∗ coincide if n = 1). We know from Proposition 1 that
an equilibrium in which industry output is right of the kink exists above the
graph of ∆∗, and an equilibrium in which industry output is left of the kink
exists beneath the graph of ∆∗∗. Thus, in the region between the two graphs
(the shadowed area in the figure) an equilibrium left of the kink coexists with
an equilibrium right of the kink.
9Of course, the expected price schedule has a kink also at the point where it meets the
horizontal axis. Throughout the paper, however, the word “kink” will refer to the kink on the
downward sloping part of the expected price schedule.
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Clearly, the reason why this model gives rise to a multiplicity of equilibria is
related to the non-negativity constraint and the kink that it implies. The crucial
model feature, however, is not the existence of a kink per se, but the fact that
the expected price schedule is convex in a region where it pays oﬀ for the firms
to produce. It is well known from work on the Cournot model under complete
information that there can exist multiple equilibria if the demand function is
suﬃciently convex. The reason why a convexity of demand has this eﬀect is that
it tends to create a strategic complementarity between a firm’s own output and
its competitors’ output: the marginal gain in profits from increasing the own
strategic variable is increasing in each of the competitors’ strategic variables.10
As a consequence, a low-output equilibrium can exist simultaneously with a
high-output equilibrium, since beliefs about the competitors’ behavior become
self-fulfilling.
In the model studied here, the requirement that price cannot be negative
creates a convexity of the expected demand schedule, which again leads to a
strategic complementarity and thus the possibility of multiple equilibria. In par-
ticular, although otherwise linear and downward sloping, firm i’s best-response
correspondence makes, because of the kink, one jump upwards. The jump oc-
curs at an output level of the other firms that is just large enough to make it
optimal for firm i to produce such a large quantity itself that industry output
locates right of the kink instead of left of it.
Figure 1 also tells us that as the number of firms in the market, n, increases,
the intercept of the graphs of ∆∗ and ∆∗∗ move downwards and, in the limit,
both straight lines approach the 45-degree line. Hence, as the market approaches
perfect competition, the scope for multiple equilibria in this model vanishes.
It is important to reiterate that the fact that a convexity of the demand func-
tion can lead to a multiplicity of equilibria is well understood in the literature.
The contributions here are: (i) to point out that, in a model with otherwise
linear demand, one possible source of such a convexity is a non-negativity con-
straint on price; and (ii) to show (see Figure 1 and Proposition 1) that the
10To see this, suppose inverse demand is known and given by D (x+ y), where x is own
output and y is the competitors’ joint output, and denote the cost function by C (x). Then
own profits are given by π (x, y) = D (x+ y)x − C (x). Diﬀerentiating π twice, first with
respect to x and then with respect to y, one has π12 (x, y) = D0 (x+ y) + xD00 (x+ y). This
expression can be positive if D00 (x+ y) is positive and suﬃciently large, even if the demand
function is downward sloping.
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non-negativity constraint can indeed give rise to two coexisting equilibria.11
3.2 Welfare
Let us now ask the question how the fact that the firms have incomplete in-
formation aﬀects expected profits and expected total surplus. The model that
I will use as a benchmark for comparison is identical to the one described in
Section 2, except that in the benchmark all firms know the realization of the de-
mand shock when they make their output decisions. I will make the comparison
from an ex ante perspective.
When the value of the demand intercept, α ∈ {a−∆, a+∆}, is common
knowledge, we know from standard calculations that there is a unique equilib-
rium in which each firm produces xB ≡ max {0, (α− c) / (n+ 1)} (the subscript
B is short for “benchmark”). Thus, in a high-demand state the output level xB
is always strictly positive, whereas in a low-demand state xB = 0 for ∆ ≤ a− c.
Denote by πB (α) and CSB (α) a firm’s profits respectively the consumer sur-
plus in the benchmark model, given a realization of the demand intercept α.
We have
πB (α) = (α− c− nxB)xB, CSB (α) =
(nxB)
2
2
. (4)
Total surplus (or “welfare”) in the benchmark model, given a realization of α,
then equals WB (α) = CSB (α) + nπB (α). The expected profit and expected
total surplus, EπB and EWB, are defined as the expected values of πB (α) and
WB (α), given that the probability of each state is 1/2.
Now return to the incomplete information model. In an equilibrium left of
the kink, the non-negativity constraint on price is never binding. Hence, results
that are novel relative to the existing literature can be expected to be found only
in an equilibrium right of the kink. Therefore, I will make the profit and total
surplus comparison only for such an equilibrium of the incomplete information
model.
Accordingly, assume that ∆ ∈ (∆∗, a) and that an equilibrium right of the
kink is played. Denote by π∗ (α) and CS∗ (α) a firm’s profits and the consumer
surplus, respectively, in the incomplete information model, given a realization
11 In Lagerlöf (2006) I study a continuous-state version of the present model and investigate
what families of distribution functions of the stochastic demand intercept that yield a unique
equilibrium.
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of the demand intercept α. In a low-demand state, market price is zero. Hence,
π∗ (a−∆) = −cx∗R (i.e., the firm has no revenues, so its profits equal minus
its production costs). In a high-demand state, π∗ (α) is defined analogously to
πB (α) in (4), but with x∗R substituted for xB. Similarly, since market price
is zero in a low-demand state, I say that CS∗ (a−∆) is given by the whole
area beneath the demand schedule, CS∗ (a−∆) = (a−∆)2 /2 (i.e., all the
goods that are produced are handed over to the consumers free of charge). In a
high-demand state, CS∗ (α) is defined analogously to CSB (α) in (4), but with
x∗R substituted for xB. Total surplus, given a realization of α, is defined by
W ∗ (α) = CS∗ (α) + nπ∗ (α). Finally, the expected profit and expected total
surplus, Eπ∗ and EW ∗, are defined as the expected values of π∗ (α) andW ∗ (α),
given that the probability of each state is 1/2.
The following result is proven in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. Suppose ∆ ∈ (∆∗, a) and that an equilibrium right of the
kink is played in the incomplete information model. Then:
a) Expected profits are always strictly higher under complete informa-
tion than under incomplete information (i.e., Eπ∗ > EπB).
b) Expected total surplus under incomplete information is strictly higher
than expected social surplus under complete information (i.e., EW ∗ >
EWB) if and only if ∆ < ϕ (a, c, n), where
ϕ (a, c, n) ≡ a− 2a− c
1 +
q
1 + 2a−c2n(n+2)c
. (5)
Part a) of Proposition 2 is quite intuitive and in line with what we know
from the existing literature. Part b) is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure shows
(the relevant part of) the graph of the function ϕ, in the same (∆, c) space as in
Figure 1. In the (non-empty) subset of the parameter space beneath this graph
and above the graph of ∆∗ (the shadowed area in the figure), an equilibrium
right of the kink exists in the model with incomplete information and expected
total surplus in that equilibrium is higher than in the benchmark model where
the firms do know demand.
The reason why expected total surplus can be lower when the firms are
informed is that a firm that does not know demand is bolder (or more aggressive)
9
when choosing its output: it chooses a quantity that is large relative to what
it would have chosen on average if it had known demand. The reason for this,
in turn, is that if the firm chooses a relatively large quantity and demand turns
out to be low, its losses will, because of the non-negativity constraint on price,
be limited to its production costs.
Given this logic, we should expect the “boldness eﬀect” to be stronger the
lower is the marginal/average cost. Indeed, provided an equilibrium right of
the kink exists, ∂ϕ/∂c < 0. Moreover, limc→0 ϕ (a, c, n) = a, which means
that in the limit, as the constant marginal cost approaches zero, informed firms
are detrimental to expected total surplus for all ∆ ∈ (∆∗, a), i.e., whenever
an equilibrium right of the kink exists. We also have that ∂ϕ/∂n < 0: stiﬀer
competition decreases the cut-oﬀ value below which ∆ must be for informed
firms to be bad for expected total surplus. Indeed, in the limit as n approaches
infinity, informed firms are never detrimental to expected total surplus.
To see the significance of Proposition 2b, let us briefly review what re-
ceived theory has to say about the welfare eﬀects of better informed firms in
an oligopoly (or monopoly) market. Vives (1984) studies a linear-quadratic
diﬀerentiated-goods duopoly model with uncertainty about the intercept of the
demand function. In one version of his model he assumes Cournot competition,
whereas in another there is Bertrand competition. Vives does not impose any
non-negativity constraint on the variable that is not chosen by the firms (i.e.,
in the Cournot model price can be negative and in the Bertrand model output
can be negative). He computes the social value (i.e., the diﬀerence in expected
total surplus) of the firms’ having access to more information and shows that
there is a strict dichotomy between the Cournot and Bertrand models: the so-
cial value of information is positive under Cournot and negative under Bertrand
competition.12
How can we understand this dichotomy? One might have expected more
information to be socially beneficial under both Cournot and Bertrand compe-
tition, since it should help the firms to tailor their decisions to actual demand,
thus facilitating the exploitation of gains from trade and making the pie to be
12For discussions of the welfare eﬀects of information sharing, see also, for example, Clarke
(1983), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Sakai and Yamato (1989), Shapiro (1986), and
Vives (1990).
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shared between the firms and the consumers bigger. Of course, however, the
firms do not care about the size of this pie per se but about their share of
it. Still, it turns out that when the firms are quantity setters, then a firm’s
objective of maximizing the share of the pie is relatively well aligned with the
social goal of maximizing the pie size; for price setters, though, these goals are
less well aligned. This diﬀerence between quantity setting and price setting
is due to the facts that: (i) socially “good behavior” on the part of the firms
(i.e., their choosing large quantities respectively low prices) is more valuable in
a high-demand state than in a low-demand state (basically because the traded
quantity is larger in a high-demand state); and (ii) a quantity setter who gets
access to information responds by producing more in a high-demand state and
less in a low-demand state, whereas a price setter responds by choosing a high
price in a high-demand state and a low price in a low-demand state.13
The eﬀect discussed in the previous paragraph is present also in the model
studied in the current paper – indeed, this is why expected total surplus is
greater with informed than with uninformed firms whenever ∆ > ϕ (a, c, n). In
the model studied here, however, there is a non-negativity constraint on price,
which gives rise to the boldness eﬀect discussed earlier. As a result, whether
information is good or bad does not depend only on whether the firms choose
price or quantity, but also on the strength of the boldness eﬀect. In particular,
when the marginal cost parameter is relatively low, which makes the boldness
eﬀect strong, information is bad also under Cournot competition.
Although the case with Bertrand competition (with diﬀerentiated goods) is
not analyzed in the present paper, it is fairly straightforward to understand how
the logic would work in such a model: a non-negativity constraint on quantity
would make it more tempting for firms to choose a high price. Thus, in a model
where firms choose prices and there is a non-negativity constraint on quantity,
the boldness eﬀect would tend to make uninformed firms harmful to consumers,
since it creates an incentive to set a higher price. Also in such a model, the
boldness eﬀect would be stronger when the production costs are relatively low.
Hence, one should expect that for suﬃciently low values of the marginal cost
13Kühn and Vives (1995) discuss this intuition at length and also illustrate it in figures.
See also Weitzman (1974) for an early analysis of the diﬀerence between price and quantity
setting under uncertainty.
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parameter, the boldness eﬀect would be stronger than the eﬀect present in Vives
(1984) also under Bertrand competition, with the result being that, for a subset
of the parameter space, informed firms is good for expected total surplus.
In summary, the strict dichotomy between Cournot and Bertrand is broken
once we introduce the non-negativity constraint: depending on the parameters,
information can be either good or bad in each one of the two models. In partic-
ular, the traditional welfare result in the Cournot model (information is good) is
reversed for suﬃciently low values of the marginal cost parameter (for then the
boldness eﬀect is relatively strong), and we should expect the analogous result
in the Bertrand model.
4 Concluding Remarks
Ignoring the non-negativity constraint on price when modeling uncertainty in
oligopolistic (or monopolistic) markets may make us overlook important eco-
nomic insights. In particular, taking the non-negativity constraint explicitly
into account in a simple Cournot model with demand uncertainty can lead to
(i) a multiplicity of equilibria and to (ii) the phenomenon that expected total
surplus is larger when the firms do not know the demand than when they do.
Observation (ii) was first made by Malueg and Tsutsui (1998a), by means of
a numerical duopoly example with private information. In the present paper,
thanks to the fact that here information is symmetric (but incomplete), I ob-
tained a much more tractable model and I could therefore derive some further
results. These suggest that the tendency for informed firms to be bad for wel-
fare is stronger when marginal/average cost is low and that providing the firms
with more information is always good if the number of firms in the market is
suﬃciently large.
The arguments of the paper are relevant also for price competition (see the
end of Section 3.2) and for uncertainty about market features other than the
demand intercept. Suppose, for example, that there are at least two firms in
a Cournot market and that each firm has private information about its own
(constant) marginal cost, thus making its output decision contingent on this
information. Then, from the point of view of an individual firm, aggregate
output will be stochastic and the non-negativity constraint on price will, at least
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for some possible output choices, be binding with positive probability. In such
a model the non-negativity constraint should play a role that is very similar
to the one explored in the model of the present paper. The same is true for
anything else that is private information to a firm and which aﬀects its output
choice. It could also be that the number of firms in the market is unknown to
an individual firm, which again would make aggregate output stochastic from
the point of view of that firm. Examining these and other alternative models in
greater detail could yield further insights.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us first look for equilibria left of the kink,
i.e., where X∗ < Xkink (≡ a −∆). It is straightforward to verify that in such
an equilibrium, given that it exists, all firms produce the same quantity, namely
x∗L as defined in (3). Now consider firm i’s incentive to deviate to some xi such
that xi + (n− 1)x∗L ≥ a−∆ or, rewriting, to some xi such that
xi ≥ a−∆− (n− 1)x∗L =
2a− (n+ 1)∆+ (n− 1) c
n+ 1
≡ A (∆) .
If deviating to such an xi, firm i’s expected profits are given byµ
a+∆− xi − (n− 1)x∗L
2
− c
¶
xi =
µ
2a+ (n+ 1)∆− (n+ 3) c
2 (n+ 1)
− 1
2
xi
¶
xi.
(6)
Maximizing this expression with respect to xi subject to xi ≥ A (∆) yields an
optimal bx given by
bx = ( A (∆) if ∆ ≤ 2a+(3n+1)c3(n+1)2a+(n+1)∆−(n+3)c
2(n+1) otherwise.
(7)
Clearly, when ∆ is such that the constraint xi ≥ A (∆) is binding, then firm i
does not have an incentive to deviate. Consider the case where the constraint is
not binding. Compute firm i’s expected profit if not deviating and if deviating:
πi (not deviating) =
(a− c)2
(n+ 1)2
,
πi (deviating) =
µbx− 1
2
bx¶ bx = [2a+ (n+ 1)∆− (n+ 3) c]2
8 (n+ 1)2
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(the last two equalities make use of (6) and (7)). It is a straightforward ex-
ercise to verify that πi (deviating) is monotone increasing in ∆ for all ∆ >
[2a+ (3n+ 1) c] /3 (n+ 1). Moreover, aggregate output in an equilibrium left
of the kink equals nx∗L, so we will indeed have an equilibrium left of the kink
if and only if nx∗L < X
kink or, rewriting, ∆ < (a+ nc) / (n+ 1). Evaluating
πi (deviating) at ∆ = (a+ nc) / (n+ 1) yields
πi (deviating) |∆=a+ncn+1 =
9 (a− c)2
8 (n+ 1)2
> πi (not deviating) .
Thus, there exists a unique ∆A, satisfying
2a+ (3n+ 1) c
3 (n+ 1)
< ∆A <
a+ nc
n+ 1
and
(a− c)2
(n+ 1)2
=
[2a+ (n+ 1)∆A − (n+ 3) c]2
8 (n+ 1)2
, (8)
such that firm i will not have an incentive to deviate if and only if ∆ ≤ ∆A.
The equality in (8) has a unique root in the relevant interval which is given by
∆A = ∆∗∗, where ∆∗∗ is defined in (2).
Now let us look for equilibria right of the kink, i.e., where X > Xkink. It
is straightforward to verify that in such an equilibrium, given that it exists, all
firms produce the same quantity, namely x∗R as defined in (3). This output is
non-negative only if ∆ ≥ 2c − a, which thus is a necessary condition for an
equilibrium right of the kink to exist. Consider firm i’s incentive to deviate to
some xi such that xi + (n− 1)x∗R ≤ Xkink or, rewriting, to some xi such that
xi ≤ a−∆− (n− 1)x∗R =
2 [a− n∆+ (n− 1) c]
n+ 1
≡ B (∆) .
Note that B (∆) < 0 if ∆ > [a+ (n− 1) c] /n, in which case firm i is unable to
move industry output left of the kink. Hence, suppose that ∆ is small enough
so that B (∆) ≥ 0. Now, if deviating to an xi ∈ [0, B (∆)], firm i’s expected
profits are given by
[a− xi − (n− 1)x∗R − c]xi =
µ
2a− (n− 1)∆+ (n− 3) c
n+ 1
− xi
¶
xi.
(9)
Maximizing this expression with respect to xi subject to xi ≤ B (∆) (the con-
straint xi ≥ 0 will not be binding when B (∆) ≥ 0) yields an optimal ex given
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by
ex = ( 2a−(n−1)∆+(n−3)c2(n+1) if ∆ ≤ 2a+(3n−1)c3n+1
B (∆) otherwise.
(10)
Clearly, when ∆ is such that the constraint xi ≤ B (∆) is binding, then firm i
does not have an incentive to deviate. Consider the case where the constraint
is not binding. Calculate firm i’s profit if not deviating and if deviating:
πNotDevi =
(a+∆− 2c)2
2 (n+ 1)2
, πDevi = (2ex− ex) ex = [2a− (n− 1)∆+ (n− 3) c]2
4 (n+ 1)2
(the last two equalities make use of (9) and (10)). Given that x∗R ≥ 0 (so that
∆ ≥ 2c−a), πNotDevi is monotone increasing in∆, and one can verify that πDevi is
monotone decreasing in∆ provided that B (∆) ≥ 0. Moreover, aggregate output
in an equilibrium right of the kink equals nx∗R, so we will indeed have an equi-
librium right of the kink if nx∗R > X
kink or, rewriting, ∆ > (a+ 2nc) / (2n+ 1).
Evaluating the above two expressions at ∆ = (a+ 2nc) / (2n+ 1), we have
πNotDevi |∆=a+2nc2n+1 =
2 (a− c)2
(2n+ 1)2
, πDevi |∆=a+2nc2n+1 =
9 (a− c)2
4 (2n+ 1)2
.
Hence, for ∆ = (a+ 2nc) / (2n+ 1), πDevi > π
NotDev
i . This means that there
exists a unique ∆B, satisfying
a+ 2nc
2n+ 1
< ∆B <
2a+ (3n− 1) c
3n+ 1
and
(a+∆B − 2c)2
2 (n+ 1)2
=
[2a− (n− 1)∆B + (n− 3) c]2
4 (n+ 1)2
, (11)
such that firm i will not have an incentive to deviate if and only if ∆ ≥ ∆B.
The equality in (11) has a unique root in the relevant interval which is given by
∆B = ∆∗, where ∆∗ is defined in (1). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof makes use of Table A1, the entries of
which can be calculated by using the definitions and formulas provided in Section
3.2. Let us first prove part a) of the proposition. For the case ∆ > a−c it follows
immediately from Table A1 that EπB > Eπ∗. Next consider the case ∆ ≤ a−c.
From Table A1 we have that EπB > Eπ∗ ⇔ 2
h
(a− c)2 +∆2
i
> (a+∆− 2c)2,
which can be rewritten as
[∆− (a− 2c)]2 > 2
h
(a− 2c)2 − (a− c)2
i
= −2c (2a− 3c) .
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Recall that ∆ > ∆∗ implies ∆ > c. Thus, a necessary condition for having
∆ ≤ a − c is that a > 2c. But this means that the right-hand side of the
inequality above is strictly negative, so the inequality must always hold.
C. I.: ∆ ≤ a− c C. I.: ∆ > a− c Incompl. Info.
π (a−∆) (a−∆−c)
2
(n+1)2 0 −cx
∗
R
π (a+∆) (a+∆−c)
2
(n+1)2
(a+∆−c)2
(n+1)2
[a+∆+(n−1)c](a+∆−2c)
(n+1)2
Eπ (a−c)
2+∆2
(n+1)2
(a+∆−c)2
2(n+1)2
(a+∆−2c)2
2(n+1)2
CS (a−∆) n
2(a−∆−c)2
2(n+1)2 0
(a−∆)2
2
CS (a+∆) n
2(a+∆−c)2
2(n+1)2
n2(a+∆−c)2
2(n+1)2
n2(a+∆−2c)2
2(n+1)2
ECS
n2[(a−c)2+∆2]
2(n+1)2
n2(a+∆−c)2
4(n+1)2
(n+1)2(a−∆)2+n2(a+∆−2c)2
4(n+1)2
EW
n(n+2)[(a−c)2+∆2]
2(n+1)2
n(n+2)(a+∆−c)2
4(n+1)2
(n+1)2(a−∆)2+n(n+2)(a+∆−2c)2
4(n+1)2
Table A1: Profits, consumer surplus, and welfare under complete and incomplete
information. Columns two and three concern the benchmark model with complete
information, whereas the last column refers to the incomplete information model.
The notation in the first column is for simplicity written without the subindex
“B” or the superindex “ ∗”. Thus, π (a−∆), for example, should be understood
as either πB (a−∆) or π∗ (a−∆), depending on which column one is reading
from.
Let us now prove b). First consider the case ∆ > a−c. Here, using Table A1
and simplifying, the inequality EW ∗ < EWB can be written as λ (a, c,∆, n) >
0, where λ (a, c,∆, n) ≡ n (n+ 2) c [2 (a+∆)− 3c] − (n+ 1)2 (a−∆)2. The
function λ is strictly increasing in ∆. Recall that a necessary condition for an
equilibrium right of the kink to exist is that ∆ > c. Hence, in order to show
that EW ∗ < EWB for the relevant parameters (i.e., for all ∆ > max {a− c, c}),
it suﬃces to show that: for all a ≥ 2c, λ (a, c,∆, n) |∆=a−c> 0; and for all
a ∈ (c, 2c), λ (a, c,∆, n) |∆=c> 0. We have λ (a, c,∆, n) |∆=a−c= 4n (n+ 2) ac−¡
6n2 + 12n+ 1
¢
c2, which is indeed strictly positive for all a ≥ 2c. We also have
λ (a, c,∆, n) |∆=c= n (n+ 2) c (2a− c)− (n+ 1)2 (a− c)2, which is concave in a
and strictly positive evaluated at a = c and a = 2c. Hence, λ (a, c,∆, n) |∆=c> 0
for all a ∈ (c, 2c).
It remains to consider the case ∆ ≤ a− c. Using Table A1 and simplifying,
EWB < EW ∗ can be written as n (n+ 2)
n
2
h
(a− c)2 +∆2
i
−(a+∆− 2c)2
o
<
(n+ 1)2 (a−∆)2. Rewriting again and then completing the square (with re-
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spect to ∆) yield
{[a+ 2n (n+ 2) c]−∆}2 > 2n (n+ 2) c £¡2n2 + 4n− 1¢ c+ 2a¤ .
Since a+ 2n (n+ 2) c > ∆ and the right-hand side is positive, we can take the
square root of both sides of the above inequality. Doing this and rewriting yield
∆ < a+ 2n (n+ 2) c−
p
2n (n+ 2) c [(2n2 + 4n− 1) c+ 2a]
= a+ 2n (n+ 2) c
"
1−
p
(2n2 + 4n− 1) c+ 2ap
2n (n+ 2) c
#
= a+ 2n (n+ 2) c
⎡
⎣ 1−
(2n2+4n−1)c+2a
2n(n+2)c
1 +
q
(2n2+4n−1)c+2a
2n(n+2)c
⎤
⎦
= a+ 2n (n+ 2) c
⎡
⎣
2n(n+2)c−(2n2+4n−1)c−2a
2n(n+2)c
1 +
q
(2n2+4n−1)c+2a
2n(n+2)c
⎤
⎦ ,
which simplifies to ∆ < ϕ (a, c, n). ¤
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Fig. 1. An equilibrium left of the kink exists beneath ∆**, and 
an equilibrium right of the kink exists above ∆*. Hence, in the 
shadowed area between ∆* and ∆** both equilibria exist.
0
0
∆
c
∆**
a
a
( )
1
1 22
+
−
n
a
( )
12
 22
−+
−
n
a
∆*
45°
Fig. 2. In the shadowed region is, given that an equilibrium 
right of the kink is played, expected total surplus lower when 
the firms know demand than when they do not.
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